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NATIONAL IDENTITY, NATIONALISM, AND THE 
ORGANIZA nON OF THE EUROPEAN UNION' 
Antonio V. Menendez Alarcon 
Butler University 
" .. .1' Europe du XXIeme siecle sera culturelle ou ne sera 
pas." 
Andre Malraux 
ABSTRACT 
Based on in-depth interviews and document analysis, this 
article examines the relationships between cultural identification and 
the process of European integration. It shows that French and Spanish 
people's cultural attachments to Europe as a common social 
organization is still very limited and reflects a concern for the defense 
of a national identity. This research contributes to our understanding 
of the European integration and to the theory of cultural identity by 
suggesting a dynamic paradigm that articulates the constitution of a 
formal organization with the process of cultural identity fonmation. 
An analysis of worldwide societal changes at the end of the twentieth century 
reveals two contradictory tendencies: tendency toward a global village and cultural 
integration, and a tendency toward cultural localism and isolationism as a means of 
self-reproduction and preservation. 
This process can be observed in the European Union (EU). Numerous 
elements of convergence are visible in the mid 1990s at the macro level. but there are 
also tendencies to reject integration at the local and national level. In most EU 
countries, major changes during the 1980s and the early 1990s structured politics, 
social organization. and the economy in the form of deregulation, privatization, and 
fiscal reforms.' Today, one can observe similarities in the employment structure 
(decline in the agricultural sector, growth in the service sector), similar levels of 
education, and similar changes in family structure, as well as transformation of the 
political sphere. In this way most European Union member countries have evolved 
similar institutions (although these similarities do not imply economic equality or 
political consensus).' 
Given these common elements, one might expect that a European culture, or 
what some observers call a "cultural area" (Smith 1990, 1995), would develop and 
would tend to reduce the impact of nationalism in the EU countries, and that 
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chauvinistic views would be expressed only by extremist and marginal groups. That 
is not the case, however. Ethnic, regional, and national divisions are deeply ~gramed 
in most of the European Union' s population. Nanonallsm IS not only an:solated 
feeling among small, right-wing political groups but is felt as well ~y mamstre~ 
Europeans.' As such, it is a mass phenomenon, as revealed by the vonng tendenCIes 
observed in the French, Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian referenda, 10 surveys 
(Eurobarometer 1994, 1995), and in the debate provoked by the recent accel~ranon 
of the integration process, after Maastricht. Throughout the European Umon the 
nation-state is still the preferred frame of reference.' 
In this article I attempt to draw some conclusions on the ~~act o.f present-
day nationalism on the European Union by exploring the SOCIal ~agrnary that 
defines national identity and nation6 In particular, I :maJyzo: the .m~festaltons of 
cultural representations and concepts that charactenze naltonaltsm 10 the EU 10 
France and Spain. . . .th 
This article is based on several sources, including in-depth mteMews WI 
opinion leaders and lay people in France and Spain in the Spring of 1995 and 19%, 
field observation, and extensive :maJysis of documents such as surveys: newspaper 
articles, and European Union materials. The concept of pohttcalleaders mcludes the 
top leaders of a party in the region, most of whom are also Important naltonal 
figures; these include general secretaries, member of Congr~, senators, mayors, and 
high-ranking officials. The union and busmess leaders also mclude the top leaders 
of the wUon or association in each regton. . 
In France I interviewed leaders from five national parties: the center-left P~ 
Socialiste-PS (Socialist party), the conservative center-right and gaulhst 
Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR (Alliance for the Repubhc), the center-nght 
Union Democratique Fran,aise-UDF, the Parti Communiste-PC (Commurust Party), 
and right wing Front National-FN (National Front). The urn?n leaders belong to th~ 
three major unions: Confederation Generale. des Travall~eurs-CGT (Workers 
General Confederation), Confederation Fran, .. se Democrattque. du Trav81l-CFD! 
(French Democratic Work Confederation), and Force Ouvnere-FO (Worker s 
Power). The business leaders were members of the main French Busines and 
Industrialist association the Confederation Nationale du Patronat Fran,81s-CNPF 
(National Confederation of French Employers). The leaders interviewed, .throUgh 
their functions within their party, union, or business assoclatton, were also hnked to 
the establishment of policies regarding the European. Umon. I conducted the 
interviews in lie de France (paris and its suburbs), and tn the Haute Garonne (the 
majority of interviews were conducted in Toulouse and its suburbs). Leadersfron: 
other regions, such as Bretagne, Lorraine, Aquitaine, and Provence-Alpes-Cote d 
Azur were interviewed in Paris.7 . 
In Spain I interviewed leaders from the three main national parttes: the 
center-left Partido Socialista Obrero Espailol-PSOE (Workers Spanish SOCIalIst 
Party) the conservative center-right Partido Popular-PP (popular Party), and ~e 
leftist Izquierda Unida-IU (United Left). The union leaders belong to the two major 
I 
i 
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unions: Comisiones Obreras-CCOO (Workers Commissions) and Union General de 
Trabajadores-UGT (General Union of Workers). Interviews took place in Andalucia, 
Asturias, Galicia, and the community of Madrid. A lotal of 68 opinion leaders (35 
in France and 33 in Spain) were interviewed. 
I use the term lay people to refer to those respondents who do not occupy 
socially recognized positions ofleadership. A total of 72 lay people (36 in France 
and 36 in Spain) were interviewed, including individuals from the three main sectors 
of the economy (agriculture, industry, and services), equal numbers of women and 
men, and three age groups (18-30, 31-50, 51 and older)' 
IDENTITY AND NATION 
The single market is accepted by many of the people I interviewed, 
particularly industrialists and political leaders, as a necessary accommodation to the 
economic realities of a postindustrial global capitalism. Other studies (Wright 1990), 
reveal that powerful people in the decision-making networks of banks and 
corporations almost unanimously support a European monetary system and a 
common market, and a majority support lite creation of a centta1 European bank. For 
instance, leading European industrialists such as Wisse Dekker, the head of Phillips, 
enthusiastically support more economically integrated Europe. In fact, according to 
many of the interviewees, the business community played a large part in the framing 
of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The economic arguments in favor of a European Union are impressive. Much 
of the GNP of EU member countries is a result of the internationalization process; 
industry depends heavily on export trade with other countries in the EU. The cost of 
non-Europe has been calculated often (see, among ollters, Cecchini 1988 and Europa 
2000 1992)' These studies suggest that if there was no European Union, 
intercommunity business would decline, unemployment would increase, and national 
currencies would be devaluated. In other words, the economies of the member 
countries already have largely undergone the integration process, especially since the 
Maastricht Treaty, which formalized the single market, with its free movement of 
goods, capital, labor, and services. 
Notwilltstanding, in leadership circles of the European Union it is believed 
that these "modem organizational forms of the economic system" require a new form 
of political organization (see Cappellin 1993: 7). Particularly, Spinelli (1989), Delors 
(1992) and ollters suggest that such an organization must incorporate certain 
characteristics of federalism in order to ensure greater decentralization in the 
decision-making process, and lItereby to build an institutional form better suited to 
the culturally and technologically complex socioeconomic system that already 
predominates in Europe. 
However, surpassing national frames of reference and interacting in a large 
area such as the EU has produced feelings of insecurity in many people. Indeed, the 
internationalization of production structures and an economy that ignores borders 
:1 
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have caused many individuals and companies to enter a difficult international 
competition. Many workers have lost their jobs ~ a result ~f adjustments to the 
European market, and various co~pani~s (especIally medium-slZed and small 
companies) are competing for SurviVal WIth comparues from other EU couotnes. 
Pervasive social problems, such as high levels of uoe~ployment and stagnanon In 
the standard of living, also contribute to a general chmate of uncernuoty. A: large 
proportion of middle- and lower-class people perceive the European Urnon .as 
dominated by corporations and big businesses, and see this as detrunental to a SOCIal 
Europe.lo . 
The sense of insecurity felt by many Europeans IS also based on the 
perception that this overarching organization is a threat to traditions and local 
cultures. I I Indeed, the European Union is another manifestation of a recent g1?bal 
evolution which is eroding traditional arrangements and tranSforming the foundations 
of the society, the economy, political ~tructures, and the int~tional order, and 
tends to produce a certain masslficatlon and oft~ uruformtty of pr.oducts and 
techniques. This transgression of the tradmonal SOCIOCultural boundaries ~eqUl~es 
people to venture out of a national reassuring framework, causing a cnsls of IdentIty 
and distress in many who find it difficult to imagine such a pluralistiC c0mn:'uruty. 
In this context, people are more and more nostalgic about c~mmuruty hfe, 
and certain traditions, and try to reinforce what they view as their lnI:" Idenbty. M~y 
express a desire to defend their national identity against outsiders, mdudmg m this 
perception of "outsider" indistinctly countnes of the European Urnon and. non-
member countries. The following quotes are typICal of the thoughts expressed m the 
interviews by those who oppose and those who agree with a federal form of 
organization: 
"I do not like very much the idea of a federal state because it will ~nd up 
eliminating cultural differences. I think each country should mamtam Its own 
identity." 
"Yes, I would like the European Union to become a federal union because ~e 
have the same interests and that will help to reinforce the role of Europe m 
the international scene. However, the European institutions should be such 
that national identities ,viU be respected." 
These statements reflect that a collective cultural identity at the European 
Union level is still nonexistent. Although one can infer some rather broad values 
predominantly shared by the population of the European Union, such as pohtical 
democracy, aesthetics, egalitarian ideology, and peace Ideology, ve~ few ?f the 
persons I interviewed were able to mention any cultural symbol shared WIth natIOnals 
of other countries in the Union-except for some rather abstract references to the 
historical ludea-Christian, Greco-Roman, Celtic, and Arabic influences, and th~ 
traditional perceptions that eXIsted even before the Urnon, such as the notion tha 
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Italians are culturally close to Spaniards. 12 The perception of being European is 
vague and distant, and the interviewees did not show a European consciousness, a 
feeling of being pan of the same community, a sense of belonging. Even high-level 
officials such as Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Secretary of State for the European 
Union, admitted in a 1994 interview that he felt culturally and emotionally closer to 
Latin America than to the other Europeans (£1 Pais 1994b). Although Brussels is 
perceived increasingly as a policy-making center in the community, it is not yet the 
center for symbols, values, or beliefs. 
The national identity that people want to protect has no precise form or 
definition, althought it implies a sbong belief on inclusion and exclusion." Everyone 
I interviewed mentioned certain values that he or she considered important and 
wished to defend in the narne of national identity (whether based on economic 
interests, cultural traditions, or xenophobic views). Eighty-four percent of the people 
interviewed in France and Spain (including opinion leaders and lay people) believe 
that their nation correspond to a natural geographical and cultural division and that 
their country have clear identifiable characteristics that differentiate them from other 
countries. 
Among the national characteristics most often recognized and mentioned by 
the interviewees are religion, food, ways of dressing, music, and above all language. 
In other words, the basic notion of nationalism, as Edwards (1985) notes, is self-
awareness and self-consciousness, and these feelings are explained by the use of 
markers such as the ones previously mentioned. Language has a particular relevance 
for national consciousness because of the clear cut it offers for people to differentiate 
and to express their uniqueness. In fact, almost all interviewees consider langnage 
as essential to the maintenance of a national identity. They think that the existence 
of the Spanish or French nation relies on having their own language. 
Language is for them not only a form of communication, but the expression 
of their cultural identity, their specificity and what they see as their unique view of 
the world. In other words, language is a symbolic expression ftmdamental as a tool 
not only of communication but also for national unity. Indeed, in the context of the 
EU it is the most powerful and visible symbolism of differentiation and belonging. I. 
A discrimination based on cultural dependence and language is often 
mentioned in France and Spain to demonstrate an erosion of cultural identity. People 
in these countries perceive the use of English language in the European Union as 
imperialistic. As one professor remarked: ''If our language is lost, we erode our own 
existence as a distinctive nationality. I do not think it is a question of going back to 
the past, but should our future be dominated by other cultural experiences? Couldn' t 
we be building the future as well? From our perspective, and not from others 
perspectives. I want the Spanish culture to be an option for the future." 
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REPRODUCTION OF THE NATION-STATE 
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
Participating as a nation in building the future im?lies fo~ a maj?rity of 
interviewees a reassertion of national sovereignty by opposItIon to mtegration mto 
a federal Europe. In France, for example, we can see the reappearance of old slog~ 
such as /a France awe Franfais [France to French] or old stereotypes su~h as a 
German Europe." People from the democratic left, such as J~-Plerre Chevenement 
or Regis Debray, oppose what they call "the mtromlSSIOn ?f the European 
technocracy" into national sovereignty (Debmy 1990). Ex-Gaulhst prune mlDlster 
of Fmnce, Edouard Balladur, in the newspaper Le Monde (1994), stated his mterest 
in limiting the power of the European Union to basic ~ments, and suggested soft 
formulas of organization. In this respect, be agreed WIth the euroskeptics of .the 
United Kingdom, and with the ultranationalism of the extreme nght-WIng partIes. 
One such party, the French National Front, denounced the Maasllncht Treaty as a 
conspiracy against la France elernelle [the eternal ~rance] (Le Mond,:, 17-18 May, 
1992). Similar views, proposing that national sovereIgnty must pr~d?mmate over any 
all-European arrangement, seem to be driving the European poltc.es of the French 
president Jacques Chirac, and are expressed by large segments of.the population m 
Fmnce, but also in Spain. Despite the differences between the ?ational popuhs~ of 
the right and the nationalism of certain sectors of the left regar~g therr percepltons 
of what a nation should be, both sides instigate fear and defenSIveness regardmg the 
U · 15 European Dlon. . 
Those concerns also bave been provoked by the increasmg scope of EU 
policy interests as specified in the Maastricht Treaty. More declSlons are now made 
by the EU. National states have lost substantial power in some policy spheres such 
as external trade and agriculttrre. The EU also has taken the lead m European 
monetary union, institutional reforms, the social dim.ension, th~ smgle European 
k t and cultural policies such as Erasmus and Lmgua, which affect bIlateral mar e , . . akin has bee 
relations arnong states. In these areas the declslo.n-m g process n 
accelerated because the majority vote in the CounCIl has been used much more 
. 1 . ~ 
extensive Y lD recent years. .' 
To be sure, a majority of the people mtervtewed would agree to create some 
form of European organization" but a large majority feel that the E~pean UDlon 
should not be the end of the nation-state as they know .t. The followmg quote from 
a French interviewee reflects this view: 
"J agree with some form of European organizatio? but not with a federal state 
such as Switzerland or the United States of Amenca Such a federal state wIl,: 
eliminate the sovereignty of each country, and we can not renounce to that. 
The political will to exist as an independent entity predomi~~es . Sixty~three 
percent of the people I interviewed (including French and Sparuards) beheve 10 the 
Perspectives from France and Spain 63 
need to keep alive a national political organization and a distinctive national identity, 
and they strongly tend to reject a centralizing authority that would try to homogenize 
the EU countries. Most Europeans would like to keep independent states within a 
general intergovernmental organization with some aspects in common, such as the 
defense policy and multinational companies at the European level. This tendency is 
also reflected in recent public opinion surveys in the European Union 
(Eurobarometer 1994, 1995, 1996). 
The areas in which the public is most reluctant to accept union are those 
which they perceive as closest to their identity, for instance monetary union. In this 
isssue there were significant differences between French and Spanish interviewees, 
particularly among lay people. Sixty-four percent of French and 46 percent of 
Spaniards would prefer to keep their present currency. Among the opinion leaders 
there was a similar appraisal of the issue in both nationalities: 42 percent of French 
and 40 percent of Spaniards would bave prefemed a different arrangement than the 
model of monetary union that will be applied. When I asked my interviewees wby 
they were concerned about a common currency, some offered a rational fmancial 
analysis, but the emphasis was more on the symbolic meaning. For instance: "It is 
difficult for me to imagine using money which is not the Franc. I feel like something 
important will be lost." The franc and the peseta, are symbols of their cultural 
distinctiveness and political independence. For the lay people the monetary issue is 
more about feelings than about logical economic explanations. 
T1rrough the defense of their national identity people try to avoid the forces 
that call into question the traditional ways of doing things. Most people interviewed 
can conceive of identity only as a form of uniqueness or homogeneity. Because they 
cannot reconcile unity with diversity, their reaction is to close themselves to the 
outside, as they bave learned to do from generation to generation. 
These ideologies shuflle identity, citizenship, and nationality; they equate 
culttrral specificit)', political belonging, and national environment. Identity in these 
views is the essence of the nation-state. This constitutes an idea that is inscribed in 
the social symbolism with force and determination. 
The perception of equivalence between cultural identity and nation-state has 
been promoted mainly by the governments themselves through education and rituals. 
A typology of collective identity has been produced, influencing individuals' 
relations with one another and with themselves. Indeed, as Oriol (1979) and others 
bave suggested, the idea of national identity is not independent from the management 
of culture by the state and its apparatus (the schools, the media, the army) which use 
mechanisms of control to homogenize cultures within the national framework. " 
Throughout history those who controlled the state believed that any national entity 
must be endowed with a sacred unity, which consistently has been presented as a 
nattrral social unit. Drawing on traditions (which often were local, not national) 
national states bave stimulated ceremonies and festivals that celebrated the higher 
historical legacy and values of a given nationality. To paraphrase Hobsbawm and 
Ranger (1983), they invented tradition. It is well known that the school system in 
evety country of Europe has promoted a culture in which the nation was always the 
, 
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. 1. E en today geography is taught in such a way that it continues to enVlrorunen v . 
. nal . reproduce the idea of natural borders between countries, and the natio terntory 
constitutes the fundamental space on a vague Europe.an continent. 1be recrwtinent 
of citizen armies also weighted heavily on the formation of an unagmary collective 
. Sharing war expen' ences generates "cultural menlones and SOCial conSClousness. 
. tua1 institutions, like veterans' organizations" (Schudson 1994:63). Those n s historically have played such an important role tha~ people sllll find It difficult to 
adapt to the idea that yesterday's enemies are today s fri~nds. . ' . 
In this defensive retreat to a historical traditlOn rests on a natlOnal,sllc sum, 
' 1 h' Mt . d I that has long been one of the strongest bases for socia co eSlon. os I eoogy 
. . 'd' tr Ie still believe that their salvation and therr well-bemg resl e mas ong :::~nal state, as they experience and imagine it. This is largely the form of the state 
that has existed in Europe since the nineteenth century. The nallon appears as a 
symbol of identification and a gauge of power, unity, and specificlry. Nallonalls,? is used as an instrument of self-defense because peo~le be~eve !"ey can control therr future better within a given national space. As Demda wntes, 'Nallonal he~emony 
presents itself, claims itself. It claims to justity itself in the name of a pnv~e~e;. 
responsibility and in memory of the universal,,:, ofth. transcendental or onto ~g1c. (1992: 47). Furthennore, the nation-state IS VIewed as a commuruty ofsubsutullon between the international structure and market that the EU represents and the 
atomized individual. 
. fth 
Th yths symbols and rituals that contribute to the reproducllon 0 e esem" 
. b t nation-state are not only an abstract representation of an irnagmary communauty u 
are also the expression of concrete social relations. . . . Indeed, the national state is still perceived by ,?ost cItizens as a basiS of 
support, and as such represents the social needs of dIfferent SOCIal groups and 
classes. Allover Europe the etat-providence IS still favored strongly by the general population. Even after the neoli beral mood of the 198.0s, p~bhc support for the 
welfare state has not changed much-Including in the Uruted Kingdom, probably the 
most market--<>riented country in the EU'· Several surveys sh~w that most Europeans support public health services, pubhc education, and SOCial protection. 
People associate this safety net with the national state, even though the Maastncht Treaty does include a social charter supportmg the most advanced social programs in the EU. Indeed, although the primary purpose of the Treaty (as reflected m the 1992 initiative which was included in the treaty) was to make European fmos 
competitive in'the world economy and thereby to revitalize the European Uruo~ 
economy (Springer 1992), this treaty also emphasized reinforcing a " SOCial Euro';"f in order to create allegiance to the European Uruon and to generate a sens belonging in the population at large. The European ~ruon w~ already a businessmen's Europe; therefore, the Commission felt that ill order to mtegrate the general population into Europe, to create a sense ofEuropeanness, a SOClal Europe 
had to be created." 
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Yet, these projects suggested in the Maastricht Treaty are not aknowledged by the population because they are still in process. The social and cultural aspects of integration have not been applied with the same intensiry and speed as the aspects pertaining to the single market. Notwithstanding the existence of projects, people 
need to experience the benefits of European integration in their everyday lives. Their 
attachment to the European Union depends on their experiences with the concrete 
manifestations of the integration process. Indeed, a cultural configuration is detennined by everyday experiences, which include social interactioflS tied to an a priori ontological perception and to collective practices that define individuals ' 
relative identities. In other words, as a result of the historical cultural perceptions and 
notions mentioned in previous pages, people living in the EU countries will tend to favor old nationalistic stereotypes unless strong evidence in their everyday 
experiences suggests other alternatives. And few things in the process of European integration have contributed to change these ways of thinking. 
Frictions along national lines still predominate in intra-European relations. TIle European Union is a collage in which assertions of national identity based upon diversity of interests are the order of the day. It appears to most people as an 
arrangement in which representatives of different nations negotiate to protect their 
national interests. Indeed, in the Council of Ministers, the predominant decision-
making institution of the EU, each minister mainly looks after the interests of his or her country." Most politicians are concerned primarily about their voters at home 
and about obtaining seemingly favorable treatment for their country. Their people 
evaluate them on the perceived quality of the deals they obtain. In Spain, for instance, people often blame their politicians for not getting enough from the European Union, and giving up too much. 
This tendency to concentrate on the country's national interests can be 
observed in the alliances that form within the European Union to push for certain 
agreements. These alliances rarely respond to a general, common philosophy; they 
are based on the short-term, concrete interests of the countries involved. For instance, the countries that form what has been called the "cohesion front" (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) are more or less united conceming north/south (rich/poor) relationships, but this union often breaks down. In late 1994, for example, 
when Spain requested full inclusion in the Common Fishing Policy, Portugal (which 
was also included in this request) did not fully support Spain because that country feared the invasion of its waters by Spanish fishing boats." Gennany's dispute with Luxembourg over fiscal policies is another example of conflicts among coootries that 
occasionally seem united. Also problematic are the repeated confrontations on foreign policy among all member coootries, and the lack of coordination on important issues such as the conflict in the fonner Yugoslavia (especially at the beginning of the war there). In addition, historic, cultural, and economic links between countries inside and outside the EU are often strong enough to forestall 
economic agreements within the EU. In the spring of 1995, for example, the British 
sided with Canada during the conflict over fishing rights between the EU and Canada.24. 
i 
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The idea of a European Union is revolutionary in the sense that in many ways 
it constitutes a challenge to the established thinking, to what already has been done 
in tenns of social organization, and to what traditionally has happened in the 
relationships between states (no nation has ever willingly consented to give up any 
sovereignty to a multinational organization). However, until now, the European 
Union has been an arrangement to which states belong because it is better to be 
inside than outside, but there is not much politico-cultural identification with the 
organization as a whole. Although the specific characteristics oftoday's nationalism 
vary from one member country to another, most of the people I interviewed fear the 
creation of a "new centralized organization (federal or not) that will decide 
everything from Brussels, and will impose a unilateral view" (Interview with a 
political leader). The fear of foreign rule is still very strong. Most people in France 
and Spain have not solved the contradiction between allegiance to a European 
community of nations and what they perceive as the threat of foreign intervention in 
their own affairs (other research suggest that this attitude may be applied to other 
nationalities within the EU). A majority of the people I interviewed have an idea of 
cultural identity which revolves exclusively around the concept of the nation-state 
as an imaginary community. Most people have difficulty in giving up an ideology 
that characterizes the nation as the sole center of collective identity, that equates 
national identity with cultural identity, and that makes political power equivalent 
only to the national structure. People from these two states resort to a social 
representation of national identity and to an ideological functioning that often 
reflects national chauvinism. 
In the foreseeable future, the peoples of Europe will continue to be 
distinguished by self-government, language, and myths of common ancestry. The 
existence of national identities is still a very important matter for most Europeans. 
Even if a more highly federated Europe develops, it is unlikely that national cultures 
will be absorbed into an embracing, dominant European culture. As a result of the 
transnational flows, some more concrete form of European culture may materialize 
in the long term, but many years will pass before one can refer to a European culture 
as a unifying myth. In the nineteenth century, the federalist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
(1923) said that Europe still needed many years of purgatory before a federal form 
of organization was created. This statement is still valid today. 
In brief, the EU is a new social space that is still far from inspiring a new 
collective consciousness in the population of France and Spain. As we have seen, 
althought some form of organization at the European level is supported by most of 
the people interviewed, the idea of a federal form of integration is only supported by 
a minority. The idea of a politically united Europe is regarded as very remote, and 
most people I interviewed do not believe that it is possible in the near future. 
Then, what is the alternative? Are a desire for "authenticity," a search for a 
fragile past, and a symbolic reaffirmation of traditional values attached to the nation-
state viable today? Should Europe continue to be dispersed into "a multiplicity of 
self-enclosed idioms or petty littie nationalisms" (Derrida 1992: 39)? Or should the 
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members of the European Union ' create a new imaginary community? In the 
followmg section I address these questions. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The view widely held in France .and Spain that equates identity with nation 
(as seen m prevIOus pages) hides histoncal realities. Indeed, national identity is as 
much a produ~t and an IdeologJcal creation of the state as it is its quintessence. By 
reducmg the diverstty of cultural ,denl1t1es to the mythical unity of national identity, 
this vI.e:", otruts re~lOnal vananons. socioeconomic differences, and ethnic cultural 
plurabtles. It also Ignores the fact that there is no nation in Europe in which ethnic 
or regIOnal mmonttes have not been forced, to some extent, to become part of a 
umted nal1on. BeSIdes, the cultural order itself cannot be reduced to national 
identit.ies, which ~onstitute omy.one level of differentiation (although probably the 
~ost lIDportant. ill the pubhc ImagInary). Other spheres of differentiation and 
ldennficatton extst; these are tied to people's positions and roles such as social class 
ethnic group, and religious and political beliefs. These categories of identificatio~ 
mayor may not coincide with the nation, the region, or the local community. 
BeSIdes, except m the mythical sense, no country has a unique essence. A nation 
eXlst~ only as a process; it is always looking for itself, constantly building its 
IdentIty. 
One must recognize that whether under the umbrella of the EU or not 
cultural representations are flowing in and out between nation-states and region~ 
mo~e abundantly than ever. Undoubtedly this process will produce changes within 
national states. Howe.ve~, the weakening of the nation-state and of its ability to 
exercISe autonomy WIthin ItS geographical borders is not so much the result of 
regulations established .in Brussels as of the increasing power of private 
multmatlonal comparues m controlbng the economy and communications. 
The EU in fact may help to preserve cultural identity. For instance, the EU 
make;; a SpeCIal effort to gIve equal linguistic rights to every country. This is not the 
cas~ in other In~ernationa1 relatIOnships such as those among private companies, 
which are dommated by the use of the English language. In other words the 
Ewupean Union is preserving rather than destroying languages within the unio~. As 
De W,tte (1993) suggests, national identities may be protected better by closer 
formal mteracnons at the European level than by separate policies enacted in each 
member state. 
The .constitution of a European Union requires a change of ideology among 
the populalton which connotes that ''the other has become attractive rather than 
repulsive" (Heller 1992, p. 25). The European Union must develop a new cultural 
mythology strong enough at least to be associated with the existing national 
mY!i'0logJes. On~ can Imagme that the European Union might integrate the various 
national and regIOnal cultures in a complementary rather than adversarial form. 
Several dIfferent cultures could exist under a general cultural umbrella that would 
I, 
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constitute what we call European culture. People could be loyal to European, 
national, regional, and local culture at the same time, as is true today at the national 
and the regional levels in certain countries. European culture could be an expression 
of several cultures that have some basic eLements in common as a result of exchanges 
between them. Together with Spanish cinema, for example, it is important that a 
European cinema also exist; that not only French literature but also European 
literature exist, and so on. 
in sum, the building of a European culture could imply the symbolic transfer 
of belonging from the nation to an ever-widening geographical and cultural area such 
as the EU, as was the case when nations were built in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Indeed, at that time the local residents learned that the motherland (or 
fatherland, depending on the country) was not only their immediate environment but 
also "something vast and intangible" (Weber 1976: 332) that was called France or 
Spain, not Brittany or Galicia In other words, the perception of conununity could be 
extended from the local and the national to the vast geographical, political, and 
cultural organization called the EU." 
Some restructuring of the present organization will probably help to build a 
new identity that can deal more effectively with the present international 
arrangements. For instance, development of a closer political ideology, created 
through morufication of political decision making in Brussels (by giving more power 
to the European parliament), and deveLopment of several forms of conunon 
communication (such as mass media programs that cross national borders, including 
news and entertainment)." 
Other aspects that need to be addressed are those pertaining to economics and 
social benefits-as mentioned in previous pages, and which have been addressed 
eLsewhere (i.e., Hantrais 1995, Hadjimichalis and Sadler 1995, Springer 1992)--and 
those pertaining to the symbolic realm and institutional stability. Indeed, to develop 
a cultural identification among the popuLation of the diverse countries, the EU must 
have a minimum of stability (people need stable patterns in order to function in a 
partiCUlar organization). This has not been the case; the EU has been modified 
constantly, not only in its functioning but aLso in the number of members. Even the 
name has been changed several times. 
Furthermore, time is absolutely necessary in cultural identification-time for 
people to adapt, to lose fear of the other, to understand in practice how certain 
agreements will work, to constitute some form of symbolism. If the EU grows even 
larger in the next 10 years, there will not be enough time to allow people to adapt to 
tbe EU as an important institution with which they can identify, and to develop a 
culturally more integrated Europe. The European Union cannot continue to expand 
without deepening. It must build bridges to the outside, but at the same time it should 
continue to deepen the relationships among its current members and to improve the 
existing institutions. The more countries there are in the Union in the short term, the 
less the possibility of developing a cultural identification with Europe. Enlargement 
implies not only more conflict and more difficulties in reaching agreements, but also, 
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and above. all? the diluting of a European identity. The more the Ewupean Union 
enlarges WIth Its present forms of organization, the more powerful the nation-states 
Wlll be. The only possible way to constitute a European Union, as imagined by 
Delors (1992), Monnet (1972) and others, would be to focus for a number of years 
(a decade or so) on strengthening the ties between the countries already within the 
U~on and then to slowly Ulcorporate other European countries that are interested in 
bemg part of the EU. 
At the same time, promoting a cultural representation which disassociates 
between the notions of state and nation, of political conununity and cultural identity 
may co?tribute effccbvely to diminish the impact of nationalism on the European 
rntegralion process: This is what Ferry (1990) calls the "postnational identity," which 
tmphes a polilical Identity separated from a national identity and built on universal 
and transnational principle~. Such an identity could make space for a political power 
that would n?: cornclde WIth national sovereignty. This arrangement, could escape 
fro~ the ~lIonai nabonaiLSttc 10gtc because the juridical and political order would 
be dIsassocIated from national identities. 
NOTES 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The research that supports this article has been funded by the Holcomb 
Research Institute, inruanapolis, the West Ewupean Studies National 
Resource Center, Bloomington, inruana, and the National Endowment for the 
Humanities, Washington, DC. 
TbeEuropean Unio~ sems to continue its COurse towards further integration, 
particularly regardmg economIC and monetary union. The 1996 
intergovermental Conference has shown that despite a number of difficulties 
the EU leaders appear to be determined to achieve full economic and 
monetary union for the year 2000. 
In all countries the proportion of people employed in the sector services of 
the economy swpasses largely people employed in the other sectors. The 
proportion of people in higher learning does not ruffer significantly from one 
country to another. Structure of the age of the population is also approaching 
relatively similar characteristics. The differences in family structures and 
morals, are gradually disappearing (divorce rates, number of children per 
family, etc.). The variations. in the welfare system (including social security, 
unemployment compensatIOns, etc.) are not very large. Furthermore, the 
model of "social citizenship state" (Esping-Andersen, 1992) has been 
adopted throughout the countries of the European Union. 
Nationalism emerged as a symbolic construct in Europe in the eighteenth 
century, as part of an intellectual movement preceding the formation of the 
nation-states in the continent. Kohn defines it as a collective state of mind 
corresponding to a political fact (1948:19); Gerner (1983: 3) describes it as 
a theory of political legitimation; and Anderson suggests that nationalism and 
nationality are cultural artifacts that once created become an imaginary 
1 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
political community (1983: 15). Nationalism in this article is used in the sense 
similar to Mann (1990:137), as "an ideology» w~ch asserts the moral, 
cultural, and political primacy of an ethnic group (m Its broader acceptabon) 
or the people sharing a particular territory and culture. 
Weber (1976) suggests that national consciousness is a ~s phenome~on 
not an elite creation. However, as the works of several SOCIal SCIentists (I.e. 
Anderson 1983, Barker 1927, Connor 1978, S.ruth 1994) show, both 
elements are part of the same phenomenon. Indeed, the masses do playa very 
important role (often negledted by historians) in the making of a natlo~, but 
it is absolutely essential that intellectuals and other people CIrculate the Ideas, 
for example, through newspapers and novels in the eighteenth and nmeteenth 
cenmries. Those texts, written in the vernacular .languages, allowed theIr 
readers to see that other people were sharing theIr Ideas, tastes, and other 
cultural expressions. . . th d·ff, t 
This actor<enlered approach asswnes that people acting .Wlthin e I eren 
. . (pol"'cal partt·es uru·ons business assoclanons, etc.) affect the orgaruzanons IU " • • 
ways the nation-state and the European Union are per~elved and function. 
When the person interviewed is from one of the menuoned regIOns but has 
been interviewed in Paris I will indicate the provmce of ongm m bracke~. 
tured · d· ·dnal· d pth m· terviews were used to obtam extensIve The struc m lVl lD- e . . 
information about the ideas and perceptions of oprruon leaders as well as lay 
people as an additional source to the existing data from surveys and other 
studies: This research draws also on data from previous ~es ~y the author 
(1993) on opinion leaders. The results of the interYlews dId not show 
dramatic differences between French and Spaniards concemmg the aspects 
addressed in this article. Therefore, the article is wntten m mc!uslve fonn 
rather than comparative. In any case, when there are differences between 
French and Spaniards, they are clearly stated. . . 
For example, the Cecchini report (1988) estimated between 13 .and 24 bIllIOn 
ECU the savings from the abolition of administrative fonnalltle: and border 
controls, approximately 17.5 billion ECU the savings from openmg np pubhc 
procurement markets, and 2% of the GDP the savmgs from mcreasmg the 
scale of production of manufactured goods. Furthermore, accordmg to .these 
srudies, planning and cooperation at the European level WIll give ~ 
comparative advantage through the resulting common ntthzatlon 0 
resources. . . d ed 
All the union leaders and workers' representatives I mtervlewe . express 
this opinion. Wonnal interviews with lay people revealed also this tendency 
to perceive the European Union as an organization at the service of 
corporations. . S . b t 
The focus on national identity is stronger in France than m pam, u not so 
different that this point requires a particular analYSIS m the context of this 
article. Sixty two percent of the French expressed concern for the survIval of 
r 
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their national identity within the organization of the European Union, while 
56% of Spaniards expressed the same concern. 
Among those interviewees who indicated shared culrural symbols with other 
conotries of the EU, the consumption of certain products was mentioned. For 
instance, a perception of similarity between France, Spain and Italy revolve 
around the everyday conswnption of bread and wine. Conswnption is 
certainly a factor contributing to an European symbolization, whatever weak 
this symbolization may be. As Schudson research suggests, conswner goods 
are devices of practical use, but also symbolic StrucTUres that command 
attention and evoke allegiance, both for their own sake and from the fact that 
they have been shared. People "see and recognize their connections and 
distinctions from other people in terms of the goods they consume" (1994: 
72). 
National identity has been traditionally fostered by the school system, the 
media, and other state apparatuses to guaranty the cohesion of the nation. 
That is, a boundary of inclusion among "us" and of exclusion that 
distinguishes "us" from "them." This distinction is present in a large part of 
everyday Europeans' interactions, such as trade or spons events. 
This should not be generalized to other parts of the world or even to other 
countries of Europe. For instance, in Swizerland and in many countries of 
Africa and Latin America, language, although very relevant, is not perceived 
as the fundamental marker of national identity. And as S.ruth (1971) claims 
in Burma and Pakistan the predominant self-definer has been religion. The 
rise of linguistic nationalism is often linked to the late eighteen cenrury 
Gennany (Edwards 1985, Kedourie 1961), when it was articulated by Fichte 
and Herder. However, linguistic nationalism has been on the making for 
centuries, or more precisely the notion of linking a particular language to a 
given population within a given territory, noder the control of a given 
political power, predates at least two centuries the works of Herder (1772) 
or Fichte (1807), presented as the most influencial thinkers in the rise of 
linguistic nationalism. The creation of acade.rues of the languages in the 
sixteen cenrury in Florence (Accade.rua della Crusca in 1582), in the sixteen 
cenrury in France (Acade.rue Fran~aise founded in 1635), and at the 
beginning of the seventeen cenrury in Spain (Real Acade.rua Espanola 
founded in 1713) suggests that there was a strong interests in developing an 
homogeneous language for all the areas of the state or empire at that time. 
In both countries the opposition to a federal fonn of organization is stronger 
among people from the extreme right, and members and sympathisers of the 
Commtmist Party. In France, there are powerful sectors of the Gaullist party 
that also strongly oppose any fonn of federal organization. In Spain, there is 
also a considerable sector of the mainstream Popular Party that opposes a 
federal Europe, (as revealed by the interviews with politicans). 
Until the beginning of the 1990s decisions were made by unanimity in most 
of these areas. 
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17. The surveys published by the EU show that this is the tendeney in most 
countries of the Union. According to Eurobarometer (1995, 1996), roughly, 
a little more than half of the population in the EU countries claim to be pro-
European Union. 
18. There were no significant differences on this point according to nationality. 
19. As it is well documented, the nation-states thenselves were established 
through centralized systems of justice, a central administrative apparatus, and 
a common center of political allegiance. 
20. Institutionally speaking, allover the European Union the state is still a 
powerful force regulating the economy and affecting to a large extent the 
functioning of most organizations and private fInns. 
21. The Commission wanted to produce a social cohesion that would suppon 
European integration and to prevent the population from being harmed by the 
single market. They realized that success in the social arena would be 
necessary for economic and political success. The social policies constitute 
a comprehensive set of protections and benefits for employees to supplement 
those already existing in the member states. 
22. This was continned by the political leaders I interviewed. 
23. When Ponugal and Spain joined the EU in 1986, not all aspects of their 
economy were automatically integrated into the common market Depending 
on different arrangements and economic evolution, several years of 
adjustment were imposed on different sectors of the economy; fishing was 
one of those sectors. 
24. Other imponant cultural links of member states with countries outside the 
European Union include France with the Francophone countries of Africa 
and America, and S pain with Latin America. 
25. In this process the myths, symbols, and rituals that confonn a cultural 
identity playa very imponant role. They are an effective tie of individuals to 
their imaginary community. Cultural identity represents the community, but 
also the social relations and the positions of individuals within the 
community. It is only by the myths, the symbols, and rituals that the nation 
becomes perceptible for its members and thai it exists above and beyond the 
individual actions. Including in this imaginary the political and geographical 
delimitation of the nation in relation to the exterior. 
26. The European Commission has been contemplating actions in the cultural 
area for more than 10 years. For instance, in a communication to the 
European Parliament (Comision de Las Comunidades Europeas 1988) the 
Commission emphasized the need to create a "European cultural space" and 
to promote a European audiovisual industry in order 10 develop a European 
consciousness among the people of the member countries and to 
progressively achieve a citizens' Europe and European Union. TV without 
borders, EUREKA, Raphael (Community action in the area of cultural 
patrimoine), Kaleidoscope (promotion of the knowledge of different cultures 
T 
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within the diffe,:nt states and aCknowledgement of the COmmon cultural 
bentage), and ~an~ are examples of plans which intend was to reinforce 
cultural commurucatJOn ~ong Europeans. These ideas of European cultural 
space were. agam considered m the European Union Treaty, signed at 
Maastncht m 1992. However, these plans have been only partially applied. 
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